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in the United States
Unemployment insurance in the United States is one of the fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms 
designed to mitigate the negative consequences of economic shocks. The system is based 
on complementary federal and state benefits, which behave very differently during normal 
and crisis periods. Thus, unemployment insurance is principally a state competence during 
normal periods, while the federal government assumes an active role in crisis periods, 
smoothing the negative impact of economic crises on household consumption and mitigating 
the heterogeneous effects across states. 
This is an element that distinguishes the United States from the European Monetary Union, 
which lacks automatic fiscal stabilising tools for the area as a whole; consequently the costs 
arising from shocks have to be assumed by each country individually, which makes it difficult 
for the area to function homogeneously.
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A monetary union faces the challenge of operating under a common monetary policy in 
situations in which its member states must respond to asymmetric (idiosyncratic) shocks 
or symmetric shocks with heterogeneous effects. Strengthening economic integration 
among the members of the union may increase the synchronisation of their business 
cycles, since, for example, the greater volume of trade arising from integration facilitates 
the transmission of shocks, not only on the demand side but also on the supply side, due 
to the greater ease of transmission of technology [see Frankel and Rose (1998)]. However, 
it may also lead to an increase in the frequency of idiosyncratic shocks or shocks with 
different impacts, since the disappearance of trade barriers is conducive to greater 
industrial specialisation [Krugman (1993)].
The United States is a monetary union from which lessons may be drawn regarding the 
presence of heterogeneous effects across states arising from shocks and how to address 
them. Examples of recent asymmetric shocks include the Hurricane Katrina natural 
disaster in Louisiana and the fiscal crisis in Detroit. As regards common shocks with 
different impacts, one could mention the fall in the price of oil in the period 2014-2015 (with 
adverse effects on producer states, such as Texas and North Dakota, and positive effects 
on those using oil as an input), the decline in federal defence spending (which has a greater 
impact on states in which this activity accounts for a larger proportion of GDP) and the 
sub-prime crisis, which preceded the 2008 financial crisis and had greater effects in those 
states with a relatively high level of construction activity [the Sun Belt states (see Chart 1)]. 
In order to curb falls in production and income that affect specific states or regions, 
monetary unions have risk sharing mechanisms.2 These mechanisms, which may be 
private or public, generally work by limiting the degree of pass-through from the fall in 
production to household spending. On one hand, agents affected by shocks may obtain 
employment or financial income from unaffected states or regions (income channel), or 
may smooth their consumption or investment through credit (credit channel). On the other 
hand, as an example of a public mechanism, fiscal transfers from a central federal budget 
may also act as shock absorbers. In the case of the United States, it is estimated [Asdrubali 
et al. (1996)] that this type of transfer, in the form of public investment by the federal 
government or social protection mechanisms, has enabled the impact of idiosyncratic 
shocks on the union to be reduced effectively. One of these mechanisms is federal 
unemployment insurance, which is the object of the analysis of this article.
The second section describes the design of unemployment insurance in the United 
States. In good times the insurance is principally a state competence, while in crisis 
periods, when significant increases in unemployment occur, the federal government takes 
on an active role, granting loans to states and making direct transfers to the unemployed. 
The third section analyses the behaviour of this unemployment system during the recent 
financial crisis, identifying some of its weaknesses and analysing its stabilising effect on 
Introduction
1  The authors are grateful for the excellent technical support provided by Marina Conesa and Patricia Jiménez.
2  There is evidence that the existence of risk sharing may also foster an increase in the productive specialisation 
of states [see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003)].
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activity. The fourth section of this article focuses on the limitations of the current unemployment 
system and reviews some of the proposals made to reform it. Finally, the last section 
presents some brief conclusions.
Federal unemployment insurance, created in 1935 by the Social Security Act, was an 
important step in the process of regional economic integration in the United States. The 
system is common to the whole union, but states also have a high degree of discretion to 
set different levels of taxation and benefits. The system is based on the building up of 
reserves (generated by social contributions) in good times to finance unemployment 
benefits in crisis periods. It has two parts, a federal and a state one, which complement 
one another to give the system consistency. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the 
system of contributions and benefits in both the federal and state parts. Federal 
contributions are paid into a singe federal account, while state contributions are paid into 
trust fund accounts held by each state.
As mentioned above, although there are some common federal rules the main system 
parameters are set at state level. In the state part of the system the tax base varies from 
state to state, subject to a lower limit of $7,000. Each state may also decide on the 
duration of benefits and the replacement ratio (i.e. the ratio between the benefit and 
previous earnings). The maximum tax base ranges from $7,000 in Arizona, California and 
Florida, to $45,000 in Washington. As regards the tax rate, each state sets a schedule 
based on a system of penalising employers (experience rating) according to the layoffs 
from their businesses in recent years, as well as a number of other factors [Fath and Fuest 
(2005)]. Thus, the contributions of employers with a low number of layoffs over the 
preceding three years are determined by applying a rate of close to zero to their tax base, 
while those with more layoffs are subject to rates ranging from 5% to 11%, depending on 
the state. 
In normal times, persons unemployed through no fault of their own are entitled to state 
benefits for a period of 20-30 weeks, a significantly shorter duration than in the euro area, 
as seen in Box 1. As regards the replacement ratio, benefits range from 35% of previous 
earnings in the case of Alaska to around 60% in Hawaii, a ratio comparable to those in 
other developed countries (see Box 1). To avoid any hindrance to labour mobility, which is 
a natural adjustment mechanism in the face of this kind of shock, benefits must be paid 
– irrespective of where the unemployed worker resides – by the state in which the worker 
has become entitled to the benefit, which results in transfers between states.
Unemployment insurance 
in the United States
THE ROLE OF THE STATES 
SOURCES: US Department of Labor, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and own calculations.
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Federal expenditure on unemployment is financed by a fixed tax rate that is the same for 
all states, of 6% on the first $7,000 dollars of the tax base. At the same time, and under 
normal conditions, employers receive a tax credit of 5.4%, so that the effective rate stands 
at 0.6%.
The role of federal government differs greatly between boom and bust periods. During 
booms its role is essentially passive: setting the system’s minimum requirements and 
covering administrative costs. However, in times of crisis it assumes an active role in order 
to share risks and resolve potential liquidity problems, through two types of action: loans 
to state accounts and direct transfers. 
First, the federal government may mitigate potential liquidity problems through loans 
from the federal account to exhausted state accounts. If the loan is repaid within the 
fiscal year, it is considered to be a “cash-flow” loan and is interest free; otherwise 
interest, which must be paid out of the state budget, is charged at a similar rate to that 
paid on federal government debt. Moreover, for each year that elapses without repayment 
of the loan, the tax credit on the minimum federal rate is reduced by 0.3 pp, with the 
revenue thus raised being used to reduce the level of the debt. Loans help states by 
providing them with low-cost financing at a time when market funds may become more 
expensive and by enabling maturities to be extended, which eases a possible credit 
constraint. However, both the interest on the loans and the automatic increase in 
contribution rates are mechanisms designed to reduce moral hazard in the fiscal 
behaviour of states, by discouraging their recourse to the loan system, as against 
precautionary saving. 
THE FEDERAL ROLE
FIGURE  1
HOW UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE WORKS
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: RB: Regular Benefits (state benefits). EB: Extended Benefits (automatic federal transfers). EUC: Emergency Unemployment Compensation (discretionary 
federal transfers).
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Second, the federal government may make direct transfers to unemployed persons, which 
can be automatic or discretionary. Automatic ones (or extended benefits) correspond to a 
federal programme extending the duration of benefits during periods of high and rising 
unemployment at state level, the cost of which is shared equally by the state and federal 
accounts (see Figure 1). During the last crisis, however, Congress decided that the whole 
cost of the extension should be assumed by the federal account, since the states had 
imposed highly restrictive requirements for the activation of the programme, to prevent the 
increase in benefits from being too onerous for their accounts. Under the current system, 
automatic transfers are activated in a specific state when the unemployment rate is higher 
than in any of the preceding three years and also above a particular level (currently 8% for 
the 20 week extension).3 These activation requirements are very important to avoid 
permanent transfers between states.
Discretionary transfers, on the other hand, have been made under eight programmes since 
1950 (the latest during the period 2008-2013), which have been approved ad hoc by 
Congress and financed out of the federal budget. Their activation has also depended on 
the rate of unemployment at state level.
As mentioned above, in order to guarantee the budget neutrality of the system, sufficient 
saving is required during booms to cover the higher outgoings in crisis periods. However, 
during the years leading up to the 2008-2009 crisis states failed to build up sufficient 
reserves; indeed, some states cut tax rates during the boom period and reduced the 
volume of the funds (see Chart 2). For this reason, some authors have argued that, instead 
of applying the forward funding principle, which ensures that unemployment funds behave 
countercyclically, states have managed their funds procyclically [see Stone and Chen 
(2014)]. Moreover, during the crisis there were cases of cuts to unemployment assistance 
caused by a lack of funds. Specifically, in states such as Georgia, North Carolina and 
Florida the duration of state benefits was reduced from 26 weeks to between 12 and 23 
weeks, depending on the rate of unemployment.
As seen in Chart 2, contributions began to fall before the crisis, leading to a reduction in 
the rate of accumulation of funds. At the end of 2007, the funds built up by 33 states (held 
in trust fund accounts) were equivalent to less than one single year of reserves in the event 
of crisis (a typical measure of the solvency of these programmes). The recession triggered 
by the sub-prime crisis lasted until mid-2009 (according to the NBER, the institution that 
dates US recessions), but the labour market took many more quarters to recover, and the 
inadequacy of state programmes meant that 36 states applied for federal loans. The 
amount of these loans reached 84% of state benefits and accounted for 0.3% of US GDP.
Currently, with the rate of unemployment close to its natural level, less than half of states 
have sufficient reserves in their trust fund accounts to pay for a single year of benefits in 
the event of crisis, and it is likely that when the next recession arrives they will continue to 
be undercapitalised. That said, the undercapitalisation of these funds is nothing new: 
according to a report of the Government Accountability Office (2010), the effective rate of 
tax paid on wages covered by unemployment insurance fell from 1.15% during the decade 
1979-1988 to 0.65% in the decade 1999-2008. Current proposals to reform the system 
Results of the system 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT FUNDS OVER 
THE CYCLE
3  In 2012, the Middle-Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act introduced the Short-Time Compensation Program 
(optional for each state), which provides a proportionate supplement to the wages of employees who have had 
their working hours reduced instead of being laid off (work-sharing). The extension of this mechanism would 
require the parameters for activation of the unemployment insurance system to be adapted in order to provide a 
uniform and consistent coverage in all states. 
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would increase the minimum tax base at state and federal level, and link social contributions 
to the level of reserves of the trust fund account.
As in other unemployment benefit systems, the automatic or discretionary extension of benefits 
during a period of high unemployment has benefits and costs. The positive aspects include, 
notably, its role as an automatic stabiliser, since extended benefits enable the purchasing 
power of the unemployed to be maintained [Chetty (2008)], which, at the aggregate level, 
provides an additional stimulus for economic recovery. In addition, they enable job searches to 
give access to jobs that better fit the job seekers’ characteristics and facilitate improvement in 
the employability of the unemployed through training measures, with the consequent efficiency 
gains. Among the negative aspects, an increase in benefits may slow the return to employment 
after a recession, by raising the reserve wage and reducing the intensity of job search.
During the financial crisis, spending on unemployment benefits in the United States reached 
a high of close to 1% of GDP in 2009 and 2010. Around half of this spending corresponded 
to federal spending, which was mainly discretionary (see Chart 3). In order to analyse how 
the impact of this spending varies between states, an approximation of its macroeconomic 
effect has been made. Chart 3 represents the impact of federal transfers on the activity in 
each state, taking into account federal spending by state (between 2008 and 2013) and 
using a range of standard multipliers for the unemployment benefits4 [Congressional Budget 
Office (2010)]. As can be seen, the federal government spent around 2% of cumulative state 
GDP on benefits in the states in which the economic crisis had a greater effect in terms of 
employment, double what it spent in those states in which the effect was lower. This had a 
cumulative impact on GDP of between 1.5 and 4 percentage points in the first case and 
between 0.5 and 2 percentage points in the second, from which it may be concluded that 
federal benefits significantly smoothed the impact of the economic crisis across states.
It should be noted that, although the above estimate provides an indicative value of the 
economic impact of benefits, it does not approximate the net economic impact of the 
unemployment system, since the latter should also include the impact of contributions and 
STABILISING EFFECT OF THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM
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SOURCES: US Department of Labor, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and own calculations.
a The benefits do not include the Discretionary Transfers Program.
b Reserves bulit up in state trust funds.
4  These calculations refer exclusively to the federal part of unemployment insurance, since a specific multiplier is 
used for federal spending [Congressional Budget Office (2010)]. As seen in Chart 3, spending in the state part of 
the system also increased during the recession, though to a lesser extent than in the federal part.
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the opportunity cost of loans. In this respect, an increase in labour taxes may affect 
households’ consumption and employment decisions and firms’ hiring decisions. In 
addition, these taxes affect low and moderate income taxpayers to a greater degree, who 
have a higher marginal propensity to consume [see Parker (1999), Dynan et al. (2001) and 
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014)].
For its part, the contribution of federal loans to state finances may be approximated by 
means of the differential between the interest rate on state debt and the interest rate 
applied to these loans. This differential will vary according to the economic situation and 
the policies applied in each state, as well as its credit rating. During a crisis, a rating 
downgrade may have a significant effect on the interest rate on state bonds, increasing the 
implicit gain from the federal loan. 
Unemployment insurance in the United States provides important benefits to workers and to 
the economy as a whole. However, experts5 have highlighted a number of shortcomings that 
have given rise to various reform proposals, some of which have already been implemented.
— Federal transfers: the automatic benefit extension programme imposes too 
many restrictive conditions in the event of severe crises, since the activation 
criteria come into operation very slowly and are withdrawn before conditions 
have improved sufficiently. This makes a larger discretionary stimulus 
necessary. In this respect, the budget proposal by President Obama for 2017 
contained some suggestions for improvement, such as an expansion of the 
federal financing of the programme to 100%, or the coverage of up to 52 
weeks in states that either record rapid increases in the rate of unemployment 
or experience a high rate of unemployment.6 This would increase risk-sharing, 
Unemployment insurance: 
problems and reforms
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the analysis of the Congressional Budget Office (2010).
5  See, for example, Fiscal Year 2017, Budget of the U.S. Government.
6  Four thresholds would be set, at 6.5%, 7.5%, 8.5% and 9.5%, and if and when the unemployment rate of the 
state reaches these levels, 13 additional weeks would be added to the unemployment insurance. This additional 
period would also apply if the unemployment rate were below these threshholds, but rising rapidly. For example, 
if the unemployment rate in a state stands at 5.5%, but has increased by 1 pp over the previous year, then it 
would also be possible to extend unemployment benefits by 13 weeks.
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as the extended benefits would be financed by the federal account, which 
would also require increasing the federal part of contributions. 
— Some analysts have proposed an additional activation mechanism, depending 
on the unemployment rate at federal level [West et al. (2016)]. This mechanism 
would be financed by re-establishing a tax of 0.2% on the wages paid by 
employers (which was in force until 2011, when the tax rate at federal level was 
0.8%) and by raising and inflation indexing the amount on which federal taxes 
are payable. 
— The aim of these measures is generally to extend and adapt automatic 
transfers, to make them the main instrument of federal provision of 
unemployment benefits in the event of crisis, and to reduce the weight of 
discretionary transfers, which in the last crisis was notably higher than that of 
automatic ones. It should also be taken into account that the launch of 
discretionary transfers depends on political agreement at federal level, the 
difficulty of which will depend on the balance of power in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. 
— Loans: as was highlighted during the crisis, the system of payment of interest 
on loans penalises states that are fiscally responsible but subject to a 
prolonged crisis. For this reason, a solvency rule was introduced in 2014 which 
enabled states to access a federal system of interest-free loans. This 
mechanism has a period of deployment until 2019. Access to such loans 
depends on three conditions: i) having built up, in at least one of the last six 
years, a level of trust fund reserves covering one year of benefits in the event 
of crisis; ii) not having reduced social contributions by more than 20 pp since 
the last time that criterion (i) was fulfilled; and iii) having a level of contributions 
that covers a reasonable amount of unemployment benefits. Only six states 
(Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Oregon and Washington) complied with this 
solvency rule in 2007.
— Administration and active labour market policies: the unemployment system in 
the United States was originally designed as a passive system based largely 
on unemployment benefits and without significant active policies. Over the years 
the system has gradually incorporated certain active labour market policies. For 
example, requiring that job search be a condition for eligibility for unemployment 
insurance and offering incentives to states through mandates and discretionary 
subsidies to provide active labour market policies. In this respect, the Middle 
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 introduced certain additional 
mechanisms to assess employability, along with programmes to assist job 
search. Against this background, it should be noted that generally re-
employment mechanisms require policies and service provision to have a 
decentralised dimension, in order to offer personalised policies and services 
adapted to the local level. However, the coordination of active labour market 
policies at federal level may increase the efficiency of these programmes, by 
creating knowledge and skills spillovers,7 reducing the skills mismatch and 
ensuring uniform re-employment support across states. 
7  Of the funds available for work sharing, 0.25% are reserved for teaching activities and the sharing of best 
practices across states.
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In a monetary union, greater economic integration may contribute to increasing the pass-
through of macroeconomic shocks between the members of the union, synchronising their 
business cycles. At the same time, it may increase the heterogeneity of the impact of shocks 
across states, given the greater productive specialisation that may be generated among them. 
To reduce the differences in the negative consequences of economic shocks, mechanisms may 
be instituted at union level to share fiscal risks, for example, through unemployment insurance. 
In the United States the system of unemployment insurance is based on complimentary 
federal and state benefits, financed through federal and state contributions paid, 
respectively, into a single common account and trust fund accounts. One of the main 
features of the system is the difference in behaviour during normal and crisis periods. First, 
states build up a buffer of funds in good times to provide unemployment benefits during 
crisis periods, applying the forward funding principle. Second, while the federal government 
assumes a passive role in normal times, when it confines itself to setting the minimum 
requirements of the system and to covering administrative costs, in crisis periods it 
assumes an active role, to promote risk-sharing and to resolve potential liquidity problems 
by means of loans to state accounts and direct transfers. 
These mechanisms facilitate the automatic stabilisation of the economy, smoothing the 
impact of economic crises on household consumption and mitigating the differences in the 
effects across states. Indeed, this is an aspect which distinguishes the United States from 
the European monetary union, which lacks automatic fiscal stabilisation instruments for the 
area as a whole to allow sharing of the risks arising from idiosyncratic shocks in individual 
countries or common shocks that have different effects in each country. In the absence of 
these mechanisms the costs arising from these shocks must be assumed by each state, 
which makes it difficult for the area to function homogeneously. In the United States by 
contrast it is estimated that during the last recession federal unemployment benefits had a 
cumulative positive impact on GDP of between 1.5 and 4 percentage points in the states 
most affected. At the same time, the design of the system ensures that federal transfers are 
confined to crisis periods, thus avoiding a constant flow of funds to particular states.
25.5.2017.
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Unemployment systems generally vary considerably from country to 
country as to their design and how they are applied in practice. In 
particular, there are differences as regards their financing (e.g. federal 
and state taxes), benefits (contributory/non-contributory, duration, 
conditionality etc.) and active employment policies. Countries also 
differ as regards the operation of other automatic stabilisers, institutions 
and social networks, which affect the labour market. Although this 
heterogeneity prevents a precise comparison of the US unemployment 
system with those of other countries, and in particular with country 
aggregates (euro area and OECD), the table below attempts to situate 
the US unemployment system in the international context. 
In terms of the size of the shock and the consequent government 
spending during the recent crisis, the United States suffered a 
larger increase in unemployment (from 5% in 2005 to 9.4% in 
2009-2010) than on average in the OECD and euro area countries, 
while it spent 1% of GDP per annum on unemployment benefits 
(state and federal), in line with the OECD countries, although the 
rise in its spending was notably larger (United States: 0.7 pp; 
OECD: 0.2 pp). In terms of the unemployment system parameters, 
the US replacement ratio is higher than the UK one, but below the 
Japanese one and also below the median ratio in the euro area 
and OECD countries. In 2010, the maximum duration of regular 
benefits in the United States was the same as in the United 
Kingdom, but was notably lower than in the euro area. If the 
additional weeks of the federal programmes are included, the 
maximum duration of benefits in the United States may exceed the 
duration of benefits in the euro area.
BOX 1THE US UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEM IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
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Duration of regular unemployment benefits (weeks) (f)
    United States 26
    United Kingdom 26
    Euro area 62
    Japan 17
2010
Table
UNEMPLOYMENT INDICATORS (a)
SOURCES: Datastream, OECD and Social Policy Indicators.
a The euro area and OECD country indicators are simple averages.
b Rate of unemployment as a percentage of the labour force (persons aged 15-64). Source: Datastream. 
c Net replacement ratio for a single worker, with previous income = 67% of average wage: initial phase of unemployment. Elegible for unemployment insurance, 
but not qualifying for housing assistance in cash or social assistance. Source: OECD, Tax-Benefit Models.
d Government spending on unemployment benefits (% GDP). Sources: OECD.
e Not including Cyprus, Lithuania or Malta. 
f Duration of regular unemployment benefits: maximum number of weeks during which the laid-off worker receives the regular unemployment benefit. Source: 
Social Policy Indicators. 
